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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal concept of discrimination, the logical repository for rules
designed to provide political, economic, and cultural power to long-
exploited groups, has failed its mission. Thirty-five years after Brown
v. Board of Education,' we have returned to a regime in which spatial
separation of races and genders is viewed as a natural cultural
phenomenon and comparable worth studies are understood as revealing
mere market preferences.
This essay's return visit to the forgotten realm of segregation be-
gins with three pieces of text about spaces. They are taken from
newspaper accounts of middle-class, conservative white women dem-
*© Richard H. Chused, 1990.
**Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Support for writing this essay
came from the Georgetown University Summer Writers Program and the Florida Law Review.
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ticipant; Nancy Dowd, professor at the University of Florida College of Law; and my Tesearch
assistants, Dana Ballinger and Ed Sisson. My wife, Elizabeth Larger, and her stepfather, Jacob
Weissman, provided especially supportive observations. Thanks to all of you.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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onstrating for temperance in the streets and bars of Hillsboro, a small
town in southern Ohio, during the winter of 1873.2 The texts, richly
woven with gendered imagery, provide fertile ground for analyzing
the ways in which temperance women used spaces to obtain power.
Consider first the relationships between politics and spaees, the use
of occupancy as a method of discourse about power and politics. Sec-
ond, reflect on the reactions of those who watched or opposed the
women who occupied, and thereby defined the meaning of, space.
Finally, weigh the consequences of permitting those in power to retain
their "separate" spaces. After these ruminations, it will be easier to
understand the contemporary relationships among gendered spaces,
the use of social science data in legal discourse, and the structure of
definitions of discrimination. The saga of the temperance crusaders
will remind us that gendered spaces often signal the existence of
exploitative power relationships.
II. SOME HISTORICAL TEXTS ABOUT GENDERED SPACE
The events in Hillsboro occurred during the final ground swell of
public fervor accompanying the creation of the Women's Christian
Temperance Union (WCTU).3 The first two excerpts provide some
feeling for the historical moment. They describe how women divided
a street into gendered spaces:
Saturday morning a bitter cold wind made it very uncom-
fortable on the streets, and many doubted [the women's]
ability not only to carry out the determination, but . . . to
hold even a short prayer meeting. But promptly at 10 o'clock
this determined army were seen coming up from the Presby-
terian Church, stopping first in front of Uprig's saloon, where
they held their usual prayer meeting; then after visiting the
saloons of Messrs. Ward and Bales, they assembled in front
of Mr. Dunn's drug store, and as the first song, with the
enthusiastic chorus, "I am glad I'm in this army." rose on
the air, it carried conviction to the large crowd that had
gathered around that they were terribly in earnest and would
endure all things until victory crowned their every effort.
As prayer after prayer and song after song arose, men won-
2. For a concise history of the Women's War on Whiskey, see Bordin, A Baptism of Power
and Liberty: The Women's Crusade of 1873-1974, 87 OHIO HIST. 393 (1978).
3. The crusades in southern Ohio had antecedents. Women began demolishing bars and
demonstrating against the liquor trade in the 1850s. See J. DANNENBAUM, DRINK AND DISOR-




dered at their persistent determination, for the wind blew
so bitterly cold that men could scarcely keep warm but by
constant exercise, yet those brave-hearted women kneeling
on that freezing pavement utterly regardless of the cold,
showed' the invincible spirit that was within them, and with
one accord for almost six hours kept up two prayer meetings,
one at the front and the other at the back door, showing a
tenacity of purpose that excited enthusiasm in every behol-
der.
4
A few days later, the regular gathering of women in front of Mr.
Dunn's drugstore, a dispensary of alcohol and opiates, as well as more
conventional remedies, was described as follows:
A fresh detail of women has just arrived, and after a
lengthy prayer, are dealing out old "Coronation" in heart-
moving tones. The townspeople go and come their accus-
tomed ways with little notice, but it is curiously comical to
notice strangers and country people. They begin to step
gingerly about a square off; as they get nearer steadily soften
their steps, and finally take off their hats and edge their
way slowly around the open-air prayer-meeting as one would
pass a funeral.
6
The final text conveys some sense of the reactions of men who
found their previously "separate ' 7 space invaded by temperance
women:
4. Woman's Whiskey War, Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 29, 1874.
5. The term "drugstore" may seem strange in this context. But in the nineteenth century,
people often used alcohol and opiates medicinally. Drugstores sometimes took on the appearance
of saloons as people arrived for their daily "doses."
6. 'The Hillsboro Battle, Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 2, 1874 [hereinafter Hillsboro].
7. While many might instinctively use the term '"private" here, "separate" is more accurate.
I do not view debates about space in the vernacular of "public" and "private." The most 'private"
spaces often are defined by or for important "public" purposes. This is particularly true of
gendered spaces. A nice example may be found in the fanciful but telling discussion of "loopifi-
cation," in Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349 (1982). Literature concerning nineteenth-century women clearly shows that the
separate, home-based sphere of middle-class, married white women served quite important
public purposes. See, e.g., S. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND
CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN, 1784-1860, at 195-236 (1984); M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE
MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA CouNTY, NEW YORK 1790-1865, at 186-229 (1981).
While it is fashionable in some modern circles to conflate ideas of privacy and family, these
concepts historically have served very different ends. Similarly, much history written about
men made it easy to conflate "public" with "politica' even though the separate spaces of white
men permitted the "private" exercise of "public" power over others.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
A young "blood" gave me, this morning, a most amusing
account of the scene when the ladies entered the first saloon.
He and half a dozen others, who had been out of town, and
did not know what was going on, had ranged themselves in
the familiar semi-circle before the bar, had their drinks ready
and cigars prepared for the match, when the rustle of
women's wear attracted their attention, and looking up they
saw what they thought a crowd of a thousand ladies entering.
One youth saw among them his mother and sister; another
had two cousins in the invading host, and a still more unfor-
tunate recognized his intended mother-in-law! Had the invis-
ible prince of the pantomime touched them with his magic
wand, converting all to statues, the tableau could not have
been more impressive. For one full minute they stood as if
turned to stone; then a slight motion was evident, and lager
beer and brandy-smash descended slowly to the counter,
while cigars dropped unlighted from nerveless fingers. Hap-
pily, at this juncture the ladies struck up -
"0, do not be discouraged.
For Jesus is your friend."
It made a diversion, and the party escaped to the street,
"scared out of a year's growth." 8
III. GENDERED SPACES AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE
These texts demonstrate the obvious importance of space to
economic and political discourse. The point is not that people must
occupy space in order to converse; that is trivial. Rather, these texts
illustrate that the nature of the space and the groups of people who
habitually occupy it will influence political discourse. Alter the groups
of people and the discourse changes. Restrict the ability of a homogene-
ous group to exert pressure on their peers in an isolated place, and
their discourse changes.9 The history behind these particular texts
brings the point sharply into focus. 10
Agitation by women" protesting alcohol consumption was a familiar
phenomenon of the nineteenth century. Periodically, temperance
8. Hillsboro, supra note 6.
9. Women hardly have monopolized the recognition of such phenomena. The sit-ins of the
civil rights era as well as Ghandi's nonviolent revolution in India suggest that strong cross-cultural
links exist between political power and monopolization of important economic and political spaces.
10. For general background on the temperance crusades, see R. BORDIN, FRANCES WIL-
LARD: A BIOGRAPHY (1986); J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3; Bordin, supra note 2.
11. Women, of course, were not the only temperance demonstrators during the nineteenth
century. Many men also were involved. For example, Diocletian Lewis, a male homeopathic
physician on the Lyceum circuit, suggested during a lecture in Hillsboro that women begin
demonstrations to shut down saloons. The women in his audience took the suggestion seriously.
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rhetoric would rise above its normal background level to a fever pitch.
The first dram shop acts in the 1850s resulted from one such spate
of activity.2 After a respite during the Civil War, many women again
voiced their anxieties about intemperance. Part of the frustration arose
because men returning from the war took over some of the organized
temperance activities run by women during the hostilities. 13 By the
early 1870s countless women believed that dram shop acts failed to
discourage drinking and that state authorities refused to enforce exist-
ing restrictions on the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcohol.
Such failures led more adventurous women to argue that their entry
into the political fray was a necessity.
14
Finally, expectations of some middle-class and upper-class women
that their men would be moral, upright fathers rose during the forma-
tive years of the Progressive era. 5 Such expectations collided with
increased consumption of beer by young middle-class men in recently
opened saloons.'6 Large-scale immigration also caused widespread con-
cern among the native born about the survival of traditional American
culture. 17 It is, therefore, not surprising that public discourse about
the relationships among drinking, prostitution, and family violence
Bordin, supra note 2, at 394. The Women's War on Whiskey in Hillsboro was important because
of the gendered political spaces it generated. Diocletian Lewis, like many other men in the
temperance movement, knew that demonstrating women would send a different and perhaps
more powerful message than men could deliver.
12. Maine adopted the first Act in 1851. An Act for the suppression of drinking houses and
tippling shops, 1851 Me. Acts, ch. 211. Section 2 of the Act outlawed the sale of alcohol except
for '"medicinal and mechanical purposes and no other" by drugstores licensed by the selectmen
of local towns. Id.
13. With a perversity not exceeded by any other historical phenomenon, wartime has been
a culturally "good" time for women. With men off getting killed, spaces they typically occupied
were left vacant. Women have moved into some of these spaces during every war. The war
most widely discussed in this way is World War II - Rosy the Riveter and all that. A related
phenomenon occurred during the Civil War when women took over some temperance organiza-
tions. See J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 201; Bordin, supra note 2, at 399.
14. See J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 227-29.
15. See Bordin, supra note 2, at 397-99.
16. While the rate of alcohol consumption per person stayed fairly constant during the
nineteenth century, significant changes occurred in the types of alcohol people consumed. Hard
liquor and wine sales declined while beer sales increased dramatically. See H. BLAIR, THE
TEMPERANCE MovEmaENT: OR, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MAN AND ALCOHOL 198 (1888);
J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 195-96; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 15 (1971). Two characteristics of beer may have changed people's
drinking habits. First, because beer was more difficult to store at home, people usually would
drink it elsewhere. Unless people were wealthy enough to buy and store kegs, people had to
drink beer in saloons. Second, the alcoholic content of beer is lower than other alcoholic drinks.
Thus, visits to saloons required longer drinking periods to reach higher levels of intoxication.
Men's long absences from their homes may have caused some women literally to drag them back.
17. See J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 83, 157-66.
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spread. While radical women debated the wisdom of divorce reform
and suffrage,18 conservative women, infused with religious passion and
committed to traditional family life, took to the streets in protest.
In light of the mythology created by some legal and historical
writing that nineteenth century middle-class women occupied a largely
separate, quiescent, domestic sphere, the movement of praying women
into the streets and bars of Hillsboro may seem remarkable. For men
of that time, watching them march down the street and enter saloons
must have been quite an experience. Drinking places were men's ter-
ritories, supposedly full of raucous behavior, the stench of cigar smoke
and beer, spittoons, prostitutes, and political discourse. Society ex-
pected that self-respecting white women would not be caught dead in
such places. But there they were, not as individual consumers, but
as staunch defenders of the family. Their prayerful presence was
enough to alter the contours of political discourse. Men no longer could
assume that their drunken gatherings would go unnoticed.
Though men watching such demonstrations between 1850 and 1875
reacted in different ways, they were forced to recast their views
towards women, drinking, and prayer. In the first text, the journalist
reporting sympathetically on the events noted that the temperance
women's occupancy of street space on a bitterly cold day evoked "won-
der[ ]" at their "brave [ ] heart[s]." Indeed, they were brave to endure
the cold, to speak publicly, and most importantly, to act as a group.
While an unaccompanied woman entering a saloon risked censure as
a prostitute, 19 groups of women in full Sunday regalia changed the
atmosphere of the space. Those who had been watching the demonstra-
18. See, e.g., Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth Century
America (Mar. 1988) (paper delivered at the Conference on History, Women, and Law in the
United States, at John Hopkins University) (on file with the the Florida Law Review); Conroy,
Feminists and Divorce Reform in the Nineteenth Century (1988) (student paper on file with
the Florida Law Review.
19. Many settings existed in which this stereotype worked its will. Presumptions of impro-
priety usually associated with prostitution arose in circumstances in which women stepped
outside of their traditional roles. A particularly interesting example is the image of the mid-
nineteenth century New York City "factory girl," who was viewed as risqu6 because she mixed
with men and sought amusements without parental supervision. See C. STANCELL, CITY OF
WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860, at 125-29, 171-92 (1986). This ideology
still governs portions of our world. All we need remember is the gang rape of a young woman
before a cheering crowd on a pool table in a New Bedford bar. After some of the men were
convicted, thousands marched in protest, arguing that a flirtatious woman gets what she deserves
when she is raped. For coverage of this aspect of the case, see The Shame in New Bedford
and Dallas: It's Not the Victim Who Should Be Tried for Rape, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1984, §
A, at 26, col. 1; Thousands March to Protest Bar Rape Convictions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1984, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
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tions for many days came and went "their accustomed ways with little
notice." They apparently had become persuaded by, accustomed to,
or contemptuous of the spatial redefinition. In contrast, those new to
the scene were "curiously comical," stepping "gingerly," and doffing
their hats as if "passing a funeral." The newcomers, their feelings
about the women unresolved, exhibited behavior traditionally reserved
for those in the presence of praying women.
These reactions were all tea and cupcakes compared to what went
on inside the saloon. Here, the perhaps apocryphal mother-in-law sent
her future son-in-law scurrying out the back door with his tail between
his legs. Sons and cousins gave up their lager after being "turned to
stone" and dropped their cigars from suddenly "nerveless fingers."
These were the reactions of men both scared and surprised, bewildered
and embarrassed, perhaps even humiliated and ashamed. The very
strength of their reactions demonstrates the importance of the women's
decision to invade the inner sanctum of the saloon.
The ironies of this scene are unsurpassed. Over the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some spaces typically occupied
by middle-class men and women became increasingly gendered. The
list of traditionally gendered spaces extant before the industrial rev-
olution - political arenas, 20 pulpits, 2' and educational institutions,22
among others - grew to include homes and workplaces.2 Indeed, the
20. This includes the judicial system as well.
21. Though the pulpit largely was preserved for men, women were more active churchgoers
and revival participants than men during the nineteenth century. Temperance concerns may
have been part of the reason. For a more detailed discussion, see A. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINI-
ZATION OF AM1ERICAN CULTURE 17-139 (1977).
22. Before 1800 American women largely were illiterate. While most would not consider
reading as spatial discourse, any activity requiring extensive learning was likely to be male
space. Though women became as literate as men during the first half of the nineteenth century,
many of the schools founded for their use were sexually segregated. See L. KERBER, WOMEN
OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT & IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 192-203 (1980).
23. One of the best accounts of the transition from the "corporate family" of the eighteenth
century to the "republican" family of the early nineteenth century may be found in the first
two chapters of Ryan's CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. See M. RYAN, supra note 7. In the
corporate family setting, economic, religious, familial, and governmental functions were closely
linked. Home-based income production merged with community agreement on basic religious
norms and government organization. Id. at 22-26. As the nineteenth century unfolded, workplaces
began splitting off from homes, women became domestically isolated with their children, religious
revival movements arrived from outside the household to serve female-dominated meetings, and
the family became a resource upon which government relied for education of its citizens rather
than a structural unit of political organization. Id. at 186-218.
There were also a few important instances in which spaces previously occupied almost entirely
by women were invaded by men. The most notable may have been the birthing chamber where
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very women waging the War on Whiskey exemplified the gendered
ideology of separate spheres. They accepted their roles as mothers,
caretakers, volunteer workers, 2 and nurturers of future citizens. Their
very separation from many male spaces, primarily enforced to serve
the commercial obligations of middle-class men,? gave their invasion
of the saloon remarkable symbolic force. Though the women waging
the War on Whiskey sought to affirm the value of traditional home
life by reducing spousal abuse and forcing their men to come directly
home after work, their actions actually tore at the foundations of
separate sphere ideology.
The women realized the importance of their actions:
The first-hand accounts of the Crusade cannot be read
without feeling the excitement experienced by these women
and their growing conviction that anything was now possible.
The women themselves saw the Crusade as a watershed, an
experience that changed their self-conception. They articu-
lated these feelings at Women's Christian Temperance Union
[(WCTU)] conventions and whenever and wherever they
gathered for the rest of their lives ...
The Crusade had an emotional impact upon women par-
ticipants equivalent to a conversion experience. It moved
them toward feminist principles, even if they did not recog-
nize them as such.2 6
The clearest indication of the transforming power of the War on
Whiskey was the WCTU, a temperance group organized and run by
many male doctors replaced midwives during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See
R. WERTZ & D. WERTZ, LYING IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 46-47 (1977).
Indeed, there is something quite remarkable about the persistence of attempts by the medical
profession and the state to control reproduction despite the entrance of women into important
roles in many areas of public life. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989) (upholding state statute requiring viability testing by physicians if fetus is 20 or more
weeks gestational age), is only the latest chapter in a long history of regulatory controls on
reproduction. For an example, see the discussion of Michael M. v. Sonoma County Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981), infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
24. The important role played by women in social service organizations in the nineteenth
century re-emphasizes that historical roles undertaken by women hardly were "private." See
Ryan, supra note 7, at 210-18. Dannenbaum confirmed that many of the demonstrating women
had impeccable, traditional credentials. See J. DANNENBAUM, supm note 3, at 180-205.
25. Many good historical works describe the development of the home and world dichotomy
in the early nineteenth century. Nancy Cott's BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMAN'S SPHERE IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 63-74 (1977) has become a classic among the earlier histories.
For a more recent discussion, see J. DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY
AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 50-52 (1986).
26. Bordin, supra note 2, at 402.
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women. The organization created its own political spaces for women
and developed an ideology that transformed the domestic sphere of
the Hillsboro women into an overtly political weapon for temperance
and sufftrage. 27 The Union's success served as a dramatic contrast to
the failure of men to accept offers of help twenty years earlier from
prominent women wishing to participate actively in organizing the
temperance movement.2 During the late 1880s and early 1890s, the
WCTU was by far the largest women's suffrage institution in the
country.2
Frances Willard, the long-time head of the organization, argued
that the only way for women to protect their own spaces from rapacious
men was to transform the content of men's spaces by electing temper-
ance politicians into office. She made her argument in an organization
tract with the wonderfully strategic title of The Home Protection
Manual:
Take the instinct of self-promotion (and there is none
more deeply seated). What will be its action in woman when
the question comes up of licensing the sale of a stimulant
which nerves with dangerous strength the arm already so
much stronger than her own, and which at the same time
so crazes the brain God meant to guide that manly arm that
it strikes down the wife a man loves and the little children
for whom when sober he would die? Dependent for the sup-
port of herself and little ones and for the maintenance of her
home, upon the strength which alcohol masters and the skill
it renders futile, will my wife and mother cast her vote to
open or to close the rumshop door over against the home.30
27. The transformation of the WCTU into a suffrage organization was not without difficulty.
Many women who strongly resisted the move argued that the political arena was out of bounds
for women attempting to preserve the domestic sphere in God's name. See J. DANNENBAUM,
supra note 3, at 227-30. The same problem appeared in the Hillsboro crusade. When taken to
court by Dunn, some argued that moving the dispute into a political arena like the courts would
curtail the demonstrations. See Hillsboro, supra note 6. In reality the women of the movement
began pursuing overtly political directions by submitting a resolution to the Ohio Constitutional
Convention seeking adoption of a prohibition measure. See Woman's Whiskey War: Dr. Dio
Lewis in Town, Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 10, 1874.
28. J. DANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 180-204; Bordin, supra note 2, at 400. Many prom-
inent women suffragists got their start in the early temperance movements. For an example,
see the story of Susan B. Anthony briefly described in Bordin, supra note 2, at 398.
29. See E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WoIAN's RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 186-89 (1975).
30. F. WILLARD, HOME PROTECTION MANUAL: CONTAINING AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
TEMPERANCE BALLOT FOR WOMEN (1879).
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The antitemperance men of Hillsboro recognized the potential
power of the saloon invasion. At times men used startling public
rhetoric to castigate the crusaders, denouncing them with provocative
humor, charges of unchristian behavior, images of prostitution, and
accusations of radicalism.31 Thus, after bowing to the obvious high
standing of the Hillsboro women by noting that "for intelligence and
refinement, and all the female graces and Christian virtues [the
Crusaders] are not excelled in this or any other State, "- Judge William
H. Safford could not believe that these temperance women controlled
their own political actions:
[I]n such a refined and elegant society as there is at
Hillsboro, which :is unsurpassed in the State, whose old
settlers were persons of refinement and education, the only
reason by which the late conduct of the ladies can be ac-
counted for is that they have had bad advisors; and if any
success does result from it, it will be temporary ...
The ladies erected the booth right in the teeth of that
notice of Dunn [to halt the demonstrations], and I am not
blaming them for it, but unfortunately they had raised a
whirlwind and could not direct it, and I think they never
31. I do not want to leave the impression that the crusade was wholly a wonderful affair.
At times, it was an irrational, coercive, mass movement. It, therefore, was not surprising that
opponents of the crusade used the individual-worth rhetoric of John Stuart Mill, then in vogue
in many segments of the political spectrum. For example, some, including Judge Safford, argued
that the crusade was removing an individual's ability to make his or her own choice about how
to live and work. See Woman's Whiskey War: Judge Safford Interviewed, Cincinnati Commerical,
Feb. 16, 1874 [hereinafter Judge Safford]. My point in the text is that, in addition to the
expected forms of individualistic rhetoric, the opponents also used themes that insulted and
demeaned the temperance women. Crusade opponents used such rhetoric not only to debate
them on the same podium, but to move the women back to their homes.
A wide variety of such imagery appears in reports of the trial of a lawsuit brought by Dunn's
drugstore which sought to enjoin the women from demonstrating in front of his store and
interfering with his business. For example, the movement was frequently analogized to the
Paris Commune. Each day during the Dunn trial, women sat in the courtroom, both as defendants
and observers. Their presence also was unusual for the conservative women of Hillsboro. The
courthouse largely was a male preserve. The various presentations made by the lawyers for
the drugstore thus had a very precise audience. For various reports of this trial, see Cincinnati
Commercial, Feb. 17-21, 1874.
32. Judge Safford so remarked to a reporter for the Cincinnati Commercial in a story
published on February 16, 1874. See Judge Safford, supra note 31. Safford heard and granted
the original ex parte motion for an injunction against the demonstrators. A short time later, he
resigned from the bench to represent Dunn in the litigation. Dunn eventually lost. For the final




intended to transgress laws, but it was brought about by
meddlesome men, and for their purposes, and they prosti-
tuted the holy services of the church to the accomplishment
of their purposes. There is nothing in women that is aggres-
sive; they, more than all others, feel the effects of intemper-
ance. . . . [L]adies, let me implore you to desist, although
you look upon me as everything that is bad.33
The War on Whiskey startled Judge Safford. While the crusaders
had the power to desist "voluntarily" and return to domesticity, only
"meddlesome men" could have caused the gentle women of Hillsboro
to "prostitute the holy services of the church" by disturbing Dunn's
drugstore. For Safford, only men could use the streets and saloons
of Hillsboro for political discourse. For Safford, social expectations
about place were so firm that women could not breach them. For
Safford, the War on Whiskey was so counterintuitive that he could
only deny its power and implore the women to go home.
In sum, temperance intrusions into the male saloons in Hillsboro
had at least three important characteristics. First, they expanded the
range of places where women could engage in discourse with both
genders about political events. Second, these intrusions forced men
to react and to pay attention to women's concerns. Whether men's
reactions were ones of contempt, ridicule, avoidance, sympathy, or
support, women could see and act upon those reactions. Finally, one
small bastion of male isolation was invaded. Tippling houses generally
remained male spaces once the fervor of the War on Whiskey waned,
but the crusaders established their ability to alter the contours of such
environments. Though a multitude of spaces remained in which groups
of men could talk among themselves, women demonstrated that they
could impose burdens upon customary recourse to such spots.
IV. GENDERED SPACES: DEFINITIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
A. Introduction: The Temperance Story and Discrimination Theory
Gendered spaces, such as saloons, often confirm social expectations
more than legal constraints.3 The temperance crusaders of southern
33. Injunction Case, supra note 32. This statement was part of Judge Safford's closing
argument in the Hillsboro injunction cases.
34. Certainly, some gendered "public" spaces were defined legally. Other than the obvious
ones like legislatures and courts, one of the most interesting was public conveyances. So-called
"Jane Crow" laws, later superseded by "Jim Crow" laws in the late nineteenth century, compelled
the creation of first-class "ladies cars," in which women could ride either unaccompanied or with
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Ohio succeeded in altering, albeit temporarily,3 the cultural nature of
male territory, not the content of any discriminatory legal norm. In-
deed, a number of male turfs culturally important to life in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are now extinct or under
challenge. What then possibly could be important for us about the
temperance story? What does it tell us about present-day relationships
between cultural concepts of gendered spaces and legal notions of
discrimination?
Nineteenth century gendered spaces pose some intriguing chal-
lenges for modern theorists of gender and law. Both history and mod-
ern life suggest that attempts to use discrimination theory to challenge
entrenched social customs often fail. This difficulty in the use of dis-
crimination laws is related directly to generally held perceptions that
intentionally created gendered spaces are significantly different from
culturally created gendered spaces.3 6 While discrimination law is built
upon or is derived from the assumption that remedies should be ex-
tended only to those harmed by intentional misbehavior of identifiable
parties,37 much of gendered space arises out of social patterns de-
veloped over centuries of time by the actions of countless people.
Even various prima facie discrimination theories, such as the disparate
impact rules recently decimated by the Supreme Court,- are based
their "gentlemen" and servants. See, e.g., The Sue, 22 F. 843 (C.C.D. Md. 1885); Gray v.
Cincinnati S. R.R., 11 F. 683 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882); Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 36
Wisc. 450 (1874).
35. Though the crusade lasted for months, most reports suggest that within a couple of
years, alcohol distribution and consumption returned to its precrusade levels. See, e.g., Bordin,
supra note 2, at 395-96.
36. I am not suggesting that this difference is real, but only that many, perhaps most,
people believe these are different things. Kimberle Crenshaw made a related point in Race,
Reforn and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-81 (1988). She discussed the differences between "broad" and "nar-
row" concepts of race discrimination. Crenshaw argued that the narrow view, relying superficially
on intent theory, refuses to acknowledge that the majority culture has the capacity to act upon
its "otherness" perception of black people by describing their predicament as a cultural problem
rather than a result of racism. Id. at 1379.
37. The United States Supreme Court's holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), made it clear that success in equal protection challenges depended upon a showing of
discriminatory intent. Id. at 239-41. Though statutory analysis often has been described as
largely dependent upon a showing of negative effects upon members of a protected class, such
effects analysis arose from efforts to ameliorate the difficulties of proving intent.
38. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (establishing that prima
facie case of disparate impact in violation of Title VII requires not merely a showing of racial
imbalance in a workforce but a showing that a particular employment practice has created the
disparate impact under attack).
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upon two presumptions about the relationship between law and inten-
tional behavior. The first presumption is that different treatment of
men and women results from ,willed behavior somewhere in the
bureaucracy of a defendant's business rather than from general social
customs. The second presumption is that the litigation problem solved
by easing a plaintiffs burden of persuasion is related to the difficulty
of proving the existence of willful misbehavior, not to the propriety
of judicially noticing the existence of culturally gendered spaces.
9 It
is, therefore, not surprising that a number of recent attempts to break
down spaces thought to be culturally gendered have failed.40 Some
comparable worth challenges, for example, do not comfortably fit the
common notion in discrimination theory that protections may be ex-
tended only to those groups mistreated by the intentional misbehavior
of identifiable parties in positions of authority.
41
Thus, any thought of using present-day discrimination law to chal-
lenge the general exclusion of respectable women from nineteenth
century saloons has an incongruous feel. Such a challenge might have
noted that women were likely to be present in saloons in substantially
lower numbers than were men. A woman entering a bar to drink was
likely to be labeled a prostitute.4 This caricature operated with enough
force to preclude most women from using such facilities. Though the
cultural imperatives creating this outcome were applied to women in
arbitrary and coercive ways, the notion that these sorts of propositions
about gendered spaces in saloons raised discrimination problems would
have seemed contrived to most men and women of the time. "Respect-
able" women would have said, "I do not 'wish' to go to saloons to
drink," rather than, "I can't go to saloons because men won't let me."
The outcome would have been passed off as representative of a cultural
norm, not a discriminatory practice.
39. Id. at 2124-27.
40. Indeed, in some gendered settings that most readers probably considered clear cases
of discrimination under some prima facie case theory, companies actually persuaded courts that
gendered social customs trumped discrimination law. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1988) (employer's production of evidence indicating that women were
not as interested in commission sales positions as were men resulted in failure of EEOC to
establish that employer discriminated against women in hiring for the sales positions). For an
analysis of Sears, see Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 813-21 (1989).
41. It is certainly possible that challenges to some widespread employment practices may
take on the appearance of cases involving intentional misbehavior. An employer may, for example,
display a clear preference for paying his largely female secretarial staff less than other workers
because they are women. But in many, perhaps most, comparable worth challenges, the plaintiffs
cannot prove such behavior. For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes 109-69 and
accompanying text.
42. See C. STANSELL, supra note 19, at 174-92.
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The incongruity is not the result of my placing a twentieth century
legal concept next to a nineteenth century fact setting. Discrimination
is not a recent concept; it permeated post-Civil War rhetoric. Gener-
ally, discrimination law operated in the nineteenth century much as
it does today. Before public or private activities are labeled discrim-
inatory, some institution must determine that the setting presents
distinctions worthy of concern. 43 Thus in the nineteenth century saloon
context, men, at some level, obviously intended to exclude women
from drinking places. But society so widely accepted the desirability
of that exclusion that it saw nothing malicious or unlawful occurring.
Today, a bar owner overtly excluding women would be acting with a
gendered intention much like that of his nineteenth century predeces-
sors, but he surely would be subject to legal constraints.- The differ-
ence lies not in the nature of the intentions supporting the gendered
spaces, but in the content of cultural norms setting limits on the
interactions of men and women. The War on Whiskey story, when
pieced together with present-day restrictions on bar owners, em-
phasizes that for many people, both then and now, important legal
questions dealing with critical differences in the treatment of men and
women are thought of not as issues of discrimination but as clashes
about socially created gendered spaces.
Indeed, at different historical moments the very notion of spatial
separation has served as a foundation of both discriminatory and non-
discriminatory conduct. 45 For a time after the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,46 segregation by race or gender was a critical
factor in proof of discrimination. But during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, placing groups of people in different locations was
viewed as a means of affirming the legitimacy of gendered spaces and
power relationships. Jane Crow laws, for example, required public
transportation providers to maintain first-class facilities for "ladies."
These rules, replaced by Jim Crow statutes after the Reconstruction,
43. For a discussion of this sort of idea from the point of view of a "perspectivist," see
Minow, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 506 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986). The Peppin court found unlawful a 50% "ladies night" discount on meals
served to women. Id. at 41, 506 A.2d at 264. During the administrative phase of the case, the
owner altered his practice to a "skirt and gown night" in which any person wearing a skirt or
gown would get a price discount.. Id. at 41-42, 506 A.2d at 264. That practice also was invalidated
in Peppin. Id. at 46, 506 A.2d at 266. For a similar case, see Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale
House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (complaint filed by women to enjoin owners of
a bar from continuing practice of catering only to men).
45. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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flourished before and just after the Civil War. The Jane Crow laws
were a particularly complicated example of the ways in which spaces
may be defined. In the conventions of the era, creation of first-class
"ladies cars" required accompanying rules permitting the presence of
a lady's entourage of family members and servants, usually black
women. Some transit systems also maintained second-class cars, which
were set aside for nonsmokers rather than for groups defined by
gender, and third class smoking cars. On those systems having only
two classes, smokers, men, women, whites, and blacks would ride
together.
47
These structures make it quite clear that the spatial relationships
between white men and women could be overridden by concerns about
class and race.4 But regardless of the complexities of the spatial divi-
sions, the Jane Crow statutes demonstrate that cultural notions about
gender, race, and spatial separation were related intimately to the
contours of discrimination law in the post-Civil War era. One hardly
could imagine a clearer example of the contradictions between the
then prevailing political ideology of "rights" used by white men on
the one hand and the legal definitions of discrimination on the other.
Despite the rise in popularity of various strands of economic and
cultural individualism during the late nineteenth century, white men
routinely presumed that women and blacks were ineligible for partici-
pation in much of this ideological discourse. 49 A number of important
Supreme Court cases of the last decade illuminate the continued vi-
tality of these ideas.
B. The Supreme Court and "Intentionally" Gendered Spaces
In the spring of 1981, the Supreme Court decided three disputes
involving explicitly gendered regulations: Kirchberg v. Feenstra,5°
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Court,51 and Rostker v. Goldberg.m
47. See supra text accompanying note 34.
48. For analysis of the interplay between race and gender, see Scales-Trent, Black Women
and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
9 (1989).
49. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908) (invalidating New York statute
limiting employment hours of male workers in bakeries) with Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (upholding Oregon statute limiting the number of work hours for women employed in
laundries) and Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring
railroad companies to provide separate accommodations for black and white passengers).
50. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
51. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
52. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Only the last of these disputes discussed a space - military battle
zones - expressly segregated by gender. The other two involved
areas in which both men and women routinely appear - the home
and the bedroom.- Nonetheless, the Court's illogical handling of these
two integrated spaces immeasurably aids our understanding of the
reasons for the Court's maintenance of gender segregation in the
armed forces.
In Kirchberg Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her
husband for molesting her daughter. Her husband, Harold, hired at-
torney Karl Kirchberg to defend him. To guarantee p;ayment of Kirch-
berg's fee, Harold signed a promnissory note for $3,000 secured by
a mortgage on the Feenstra's small house in the Irish Bayou south
of New Orleans. A short time later, the dispute was settled. Joan
Feenstra dropped her criminal complaint and got a divorce, and Harold
Feenstra agreed to leave the jurisdiction. Because Harold had paid
less than $1,000 of his $3,000 legal fee, Kirchberg sought to foreclose
on the Irish Bayou house. Joan Feenstra, with the help of a legal
services attorney, resisted the foreclosure action on the theory that
the Louisiana Civil Code "head and master" provision giving husbands,
but not wives, the right unilaterally to encumber community property
violated the equal protection clause.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall used the test announced
in prior cases holding express gender classifications unconstitutional
unless they fairly and substantially related to an important governmen-
tal interest.5 The Court required "the party seeking to uphold a statute
that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' for the challenged classification."- Be-
cause Kirchberg could not do so, Joan Feenstra prevailed.5 7
Of the three gender cases decided by the Court in the spring of
1981, Kirchberg was the most straightforward. Feenstra got the votes
of all the Justices, though in a short opinion two concurred in the
result.5 Several factors made the case easy. First, the unfortunate
53. Michael M. actually involved sexual intercourse that occurred outside. Michael M., 450
U.S. at 466-67. However, I use "bedroom" metaphorically here to mean any space in which
men and women are intimate.
54. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 456-58.
55. See id. at 459 (citing Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
56. Id. at 461 (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
57. Id.




nature of Joan Feenstra's story cast her as the victim of a deviant
husband and a greedy lawyer. Once the Court granted certiorari, it
was unlikely that Feenstra's losing streak would be extended. 59 Sec-
ond, Louisiana repealed the "head and master" provision of its commu-
nity property system before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in the caseA° Since virtually all other states already had taken similar
steps to reform their common law or community property systems, 61
the outcome of Kirchberg lacked practical significance. It was, as it
were, a "freebie."62
Finally, by 1981 the legal issues in the case largely were noncon-
troversial. The upper-class home of the mid-eighteenth century, gen-
erally viewed as a patriarchal space, was losing its quality as a wholly
male-dominated arena. Family property law had been the subject of
legislative and judicial debate for over 150 years. 3 Along with divorce
law,6 alteration of various male management features of marital prop-
59. For further information on the unfortunate story of Joan Feenstra, see R. CHUSED,
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 280-82 (1988).
60. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 458.
61. See Rileyi Equal Management in Louisiana - Some Flaws Still Exist, 8 COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 151, 152-53 (1981).
62. At first glance, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979), appear similar to Kirchberg. In both cases biological fathers were denied rights
associated with their children under state laws establishing "hurdles" that fathers, but not
mothers, had to clear before they could be recognized as parents. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68;
Parham, 441 U.S. at 356-59. Hurdle jumping for women was said to be unconstitutional in
Kirchberg. 450 U.S. at 460-61. A provision in Louisiana's head and master statute which permit-
ted a married woman to file a statement renouncing the male management features of the
community property system did not save the scheme. See id. at 460 (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. art 2404 (West Supp. 1981)). But the apparent dissonance between Lehr and Kirchberg
only emphasizes my point. Lehr confirmed the strong cultural links between motherhood and
parenting. Kirchberg illustrated the demise of strong cultural links between the status of wife
and the management of property. For a further discussion of the varying treatment of these
two sets of cultural assumptions, see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
63. Male management features of common law property regimes gradually disappeared
beginning in the 1830s. See N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986); Chused, Married Women's Property Law:
1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). For a discussion of the reform of community property
regimes, see K. LAzARou, CONCEALED UNDER PETTICOATS: MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY
AND THE LAW OF TEXAS, 1840-1913 (1986).
64. See M. BLAKE, ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
1-63 (1962); Censer, Smiling Through Her Tears: Antebellum Southern Women and Divorce,
25 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 24 (1981); Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth
Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 585 (1976); Schultz, Divorce in Early America:
Origins and Patterns in Three North Central States, 25 Socio. Q. 511 (1984).
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erty law was one of the earliest objects of gender-based reform after
the Revolutionary War. Alterations of women's role in the family,
especially the important obligation to prepare children to take on civic
responsibilities in a new republic, accompanied significant improve-
ments in the education and literacy of women, growth in the impor-
tance of women's public service activities, and support for increased
economic responsibilities in the home. Women's expanding post-Civil
War roles as merchant and family consumer created additional pres-
sure to ease wives' economic isolation. As time passed, women gradu-
ally gained a measure of control over inheritances, gifts, personal
property, credit, and wages.
Though women actively supported property reforms through much
of the century, many men also found the changes beneficial. The early
married women's property acts, which generally exempted married
women's property from attachment by creditors of their husbands,
had the effect of preserving some assets from the ravages of an unpre-
dictable, panic-beset economy. Insulating wives' property from family
creditors thus increased the resources available for management by
fathers and husbands. Similarly, latter acts permitting women to un-
dertake commercial enterprises or granting women the right to sue
for wages yielded more assets for men to manage. Not until Kirchberg
did the final, overtly gendered family property law barriers to women's
entry into the economy - the rules on male management of family
wealth - fall.
By the time of the Kirchberg decision, women routinely were man-
aging both personal and family assets. The common law notion of a
patriarchal family space became ideologically barren in an era of high
divorce rates, large labor force participation by women, and high fam-
ily consumption expenditures by middle-class wives. By 1981 no signif-
icant segment of the culture had much interest either in reducing the
ability of women to spend what money they owned or in maintaining
legal vocabulary overtly granting men economic control of family
spaces.- Kirchberg simply represented the final constitutionalization
of this long historical process. Louisiana's "head and master" rule
fulfilled all the now traditional indicia of an easy discrimination case.
The statute facially favored men, a woman was palpably injured by
an allegedly child-molesting husband and a greedy lawyer, and the
legal rule under attack was out of the mainstream of cultural under-
65. These changes do not mean that most women actually have gained economic control
over family finances. Indeed for many women heading families without husbands, the controlling
agent may be the state.
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standings. The Court, therefore, felt free to use standard legal analysis
to strike down the restriction, superficially ending centuries of legal
discourse about management of the family home as space dominated
by its male rather than its female occupants.6
The Court decided Kirchberg and Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Court" on the same day. Michael M. was convicted of having inter-
course with a woman under the age of eighteen who was not his wife.
Since California law did not forbid women from having intercourse
with men under eighteen, 69 Michael M. challenged his conviction on
equal protection grounds.70 The Court's opinions reflected significant
splits. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of four,' 1 and Justice
Blackmun, concurring separately,2 each took the position that the
statute bore a fair and substantial relationship to an important state
interest and therefore passed constitutional muster.7 Justice Brennan
dissented with two colleagues, 4 and Justice Stevens dissented sepa-
rately 5
Even before the various opinions were announced it was easy to
predict that the case would be harder to resolve than Kirchberg.
Michael M. concerned sexuality - when people get it, how they use
it, and what it produces - hardly subjects handled with equanimity
66. Though the primary focus of this essay is on gender-segregated spaces, Kirchberg
suggests that spatial analysis of integrated spaces also is quite useful. While family spaces are
often, though not always, occupied by adults of both genders, the exercise of power in such
space may be heavily dependent upon the purposes for which the place is created. As the
discussion of Michael M. following this footnote will demonstrate, different kinds of spaces
simultaneously occupied by men and women may produce quite different ideological reactions
in the culture at large. For a discussion of shared spaces, see infra note 94. Indeed, such
differences in the Court's reactions to Kirchberg and Michael M. provide insight into the moti-
vations for retaining gender segregation in the armed forces in Rostker. See infra notes 99-107
and accompanying text.
67. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
68. Id. at 466-67.
69. California law made sexual intercourse with a person of either gender under age 14
illegal. Id. at 477 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 288 (West Supp.
1981)). Michael M., therefore, involved a dispute about the actions of persons between the ages
of 14 and 17.
70. Id. at 473.
71. Id. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart also authored a concurring
opinion. Id. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 481 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 467, 470 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); id. at 479 (Stewart, J., concurring).
74. Justice Brennan wrote for Justices White and Marshall. Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
75. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and poise over the years.76 Sexuality and pregnancy frequently have
been the subject of irrational, sometimes hysterical, state regulation
and court discussion. When middle-class married women began to
abort with some frequency in the 1840s, cries of fear arose over family
decline and recreational sex.77 Concurrently, the emerging medical
"profession," s eager to remove midwives from control of obstetrics, 7
viewed abortion restrictions as helpful to their professional goals,
necessary for religious and moral reasons, and mandatory for protec-
tion of the family. Legislative restrictions emerged.8 Loss of men in
the Civil War; widespread acceptance of links between genetics and
cultural success; high birth rates among poor, immigrant, and African-
American families; and declining birth rates among native-born Amer-
ican women created great alarm in some circles over the imminent
collapse of our culture. The resulting Comstock-era restrictions on the
manufacture, distribution, and promotion of birth control devices,
partly designed to "encourage" middle-class women to increase their
reproduction rates, ironically made controlling birth rates among less-
favored classes more difficult. sl Recent abortion debates re-emphasize
the degree to which pregnancy is viewed as an appropriate subject
of state control. Little doubt exists that sexuality and pregnancy,
often spoken of as the most private of human experiences, also are
among the most common subjects of avid legal discourse and regula-
tion.- Most of this discourse has been about women, not men. Despite
76. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (equating consensual
homosexual conduct to incest); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (treating distinctions based
on pregnancy as unrelated to gender). For commentary on Michael M., see Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387 (1984); Williams, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 8 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 175 (1982).
77. See J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900, at 46-85 (1978).
78. Medicine hardly was a profession as we now know it. Many schools of thought existed
on how to cure disease; education was primitive, promising results were elusive, and doctors
had less than positive reputations. Nonetheless, clear signs showed that medical practitioners
were beginning to stratify into various groups with some claiming professional status and exper-
tise. See R. WERTZ & D. WERTZ, supra note 23.
79. Much of nineteenth century medicine involved obstetrics. Other than overseeing death,
birth was the most prominent medical event of the times. See id.
80. See J. MOHR, supra note 77.
81. For a general history of the Comstock Movement, see C. DIENES, LAW, POLITICS
AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972).
82. This is one of the major contentions in Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); see also Kennedy, supra note 7.
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the obvious participation of both men and women in heterosexual
intimacy, regulation of sexuality and pregnancy often has mirrored
cultural perceptions of sexual activity as occurring in spaces domi-
nated, though not solely occupied, by men.
Michael M. is a perfect example of the judicial confusion in dealing
with space involving sexuality. Though the defendant was a young
man, the opinions mostly were about women, and about how the state
should regulate the sexuality of young women to control pregnancy
and birth rates. Justice Rehnquist set the tone in his plurality opinion.
After giving a not-too-polite bow to the governing equal protection
standard,3 he wrote,
We are satisfied not only that the prevention of illegiti-
mate pregnancy is at least one of the "purposes" of the
statute, but also that the State has a strong interest in
preventing such pregnancy....
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young
men and young women are not similarly situated with respect
to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only
women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportion-
ately the profound physical, emotional and psychological con-
sequences of sexual activity....
Because virtually all of the significant harmful and ines-
capably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall
on the young female, a legislature acts well within its author-
ity when it elects to punish only the participant who, by
nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct....
A criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to
roughly "equalize" the deterrents on the sexes.3
This analysis is intriguing for at least two reasons. First, Rehn-
quist's reconstruction of a rational basis for the California legislature's
adoption of the statute missed much of the story behind the revision
of statutory rape laws around the turn of this century. Second, Rehn-
83. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist, in
contrast to the language in Kirchberg calling for an. "exceedingly persuasive justification for"'
a gender classification, see Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 461 (quoting Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)), noted that the "Court has consistently upheld statutes where
the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances." Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion).
84. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470-73 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
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quist's linking, by "nature," of women to the consequences of inter-
course betrayed an array of fundamental biases that made his definition
of "discrimination" wholly contingent on his own set of cultural values.
Justice Brennan's dissent8 contained a slightly better explanation
of the origins of California's statutory rape statute. California, like
most states, raised the age of consent for young women, but not men,
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 6 Though
Brennan was correct in suggesting that the Progressives of that era
voiced greater concerns about the chastity of young women than they
did about the chastity of young men,87 their discourse was part of a
multifaceted attack on prostitution and white slave traffic. That attack
resulted in measures such as the Mann Act and increases in the age
of consent for women.8 Rehnquist's notion that adopting different
ages of consent for young men and women is rationally related to a
desire to prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births among young
women totally ignored the content of the relationship between statu-
tory rape and prostitution regulation. Recognition of the Progressive-
era "logic" supporting reduction of the age of consent for young women
- that premarital intimacy by women inevitably led to prostitution
- would have made it much more difficult for the Court to uphold
Michael M.'s conviction. That sort of stereotyping is much less har-
monious with extant cultural values than the commonly voiced desire
to reduce out-of-wedlock births.
But more important for our purposes, Rehnquist's blithe acceptance
of a theory using the "natural" burdens of pregnancy upon women as
a basis for approving the conviction of men for statutory rape relied
upon a set of remarkable assumptions. First, his analysis assumed
automatic links between intercourse, pregnancy, and birth, thereby
ignoring both birth control and abortion s9 Second, his construction of
the burdens of intercourse as "naturally" female mirrored centuries
of cultural demands dictating that not only the physical, but also the
85. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. California raised the age successively to 14, 16, and 18 in 1889, 1897, and 1913. See
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See R. ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 1900-1918, at
27, 55 (1982); Myers, Changes in the Maryland Statutory Rape Laws During the Progressive
Era (1987) (student paper on file in author's office).
89. While many teenagers may ignore these possibilities or have difficulty gaining access
to family planning services, that. certainly is not true for all sexually active young people. We




emotional and psychological, to say nothing of the financial, 9' conse-
quences of both birth and childcare automatically burden women.
Though the facts of Michael M. suggested that it concerned a man
dominating the space of sexual intimacy by raping a woman, 91 Rehn-
quist could see only pictures of young single mothers in troubled
domestic spheres. His confusion,9 like that of innumerable jurists and
legislators attempting to trudge through the power relationships of
intimate spaces, was imnense.
Ironically, Rehnquist's reasoning led to the affirmance of an aggres-
sive man's criminal conviction.9 But the same result could have been
reached by different reasoning. If the plurality had assumed that the
nonphysical burdens of pregnancy and childrearing must occur in
shared space,9 then California's statutory structure might well have
failed constitutional scrutiny. And, as in all equal protection cases,
the invalidity of a scheme simply would have moved the inquiry to
the remedy stage: to a decision about abolishing the entire regulatory
90. While the normal legal rules require fathers to support their children, many fathers
fail to do so. Divorced and single women routinely bear the financial burdens of parenting. See
Brinig & Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REv. 855 (1988);
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 789; Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Prop-
erty, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181 (1981).
91. See infra note 99. Fran Olsen discusses both the frequently aggressive content of
sexuality for men and the potential for use of statutory rape laws to control that tendency. See
Olsen, supra note 76, at 402-04.
92. In part, his confusion was generated by the structure of the litigation. The prosecution's
failure to charge the defendant with rape, rather than statutory rape, see Michael M., 450 U.S.
at 500-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting), forced the Court to analyze the setting in a peculiar way.
Nonetheless, the Justices displayed singularly glaring ineptitude in wading through the contradic-
tions involved in treating a rape as consensual intercourse. The confusion in Michael M. is
duplicated in other settings, such as the refusal of many jurisdictions to prosecute men for
raping their wives. See West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990).
93. Concern over this irony in Michael M. is reduced significantly by strong evidence that
the case actually involved a forcible rape rather than consensual intercourse. See Michael M.,
450 U.S. at 483 n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring) (testimony excerpt); see also infra note 99.
94. Just as the Kirchberg decision was premised on the assumption that family economies
normally operate in a shared space, the Michael M. Court could have assumed that childcare
is "naturally" a shared enterprise. The change in purpose from economy to childrearing hardly
justifies different treatment of the spaces. This reasoning relies on some of the same, and
arguably erroneous, assumptions the Court made, particularly the notion that statutory rape
laws are designed to prevent young people from having children. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470
(Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). The major change in assumptions made in the text involves
restructuring only the burdens of childrearing.
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structure or extending its scope to all sexually active teenagers. Thus,
rather than freeing Michael M., the Court could have given California
the ability either to prosecute or release both genders.
Justice Rehnquist's "natural" law allocation of the burdens of preg-
nancy and childcare is reminiscent of earlier judicial approval of
women's protective labor legislation in Muller v. Oregon.95 The Court
upheld such legislation on the theory that work spaces occupied by
women, "naturally" weaker creatures than men, could be the objects
of special regulatory concern.96 Both Michael M. and Muller are superb
examples of the Court's failure to recognize that the outcomes of their
cases are heavily dependent on cultural understandings about the "nat-
ural" division of roles in spaces occupied by one or both genders.
Comparison with Kirchberg is instructive. While shared decision-
making about the family economy now is required constitutionally,
the burdens of intercourse, pregnancy, and childrearing still belong
"naturally" to women. While marital property regimes calling for the
equitable distribution of the capital of a marriage are now com-
monplace,9 7 discussion of equalizing the psychological and economic
obligations of childcare often produces agonizing debates and cries of
discrimination against men. The "natural" law of a century ago -
that men had the innate ability to manage money and women had the
innate ability to care for children - only partially has dissipated.
Though the Court has declared itself committed to removing
stereotypes from its analysis of spaces and spatial roles, we should
not be surprised by their utter failure to accomplish that goal.
After Michael M., the result in Rostker v. Goldberg,98 a challenge
to the legitimacy of male-only draft registration, was preordained.
How could a Court- that viewed all of the burdens of sexuality, preg-
95. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
96. Id. at 421-23. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state labor
law as an arbitrary interference with the freedom of men to contract).
97. Though, the legal discourse in these statutes uses a concept of sharing, the reality is
quite different. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Much of the difference results from
the still "natural" obligations of women to assume custody of the children without full financial
support from their departed spouses and to work for wages significantly below their male
colleagues.
98. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
99. Though Justice Rehnquist spoke only for a four-judge plurality in Michael M., Justice
Blackmun's hopelessly confused concurring opinion is worse. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 481
(Blackmun, J., concurring). After desperately trying to distinguish his willingness to permit
California to control the sexuality of a teenager while insisting that privacy rights necessitate
access to abortions, he simply declared that Michael M.'s conviction met the Craig v. Boren
requirement of a fair and substantial relationship between a gender classification and state
policy. Id. at 483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He ended his short opinion with a note that
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nancy, and childcare as quintessentially women's possibly overcome
the equally powerful stereotype that war is a "natural" space for men?
As things turned out, it could not. In his opinion for a majority of
six, 10 Justice Rehnquist plainly articulated an unwillingness to confront
basic fears about women serving on the front lines. Despite the appar-
ent mandate of Craig v. Boren'0 to uphold overt gender classifications
only when fairly and substantially related to a legitimate legislative
goal, 1°2 Rehnquist devoted a large part of his opinion to the Court's
"lack of competence" to review matters involving the military. 0 3 Exer-
cising "healthy deference" to congressional judgment, he argued that
Congress did not act "unthinkingly" or "reflexively" in deciding to
order only men to register and that the registration scheme was,
therefore, not a stereotypical "'by-product of a traditional way of
thinking about females."' '  Since Congress acted on the assumptions
that registration would be used only to draft combat troops and that
prior legislation forbade the use of women as combat troops, Rehnquist
contended that women were situated differently from men for purposes
of registration. 0 , The Court thus deferred to the reasonable legislative
decision to avoid wasting resources by asking only men to register. 106
Rehnquist's views were encapsulated by his statement that Congress
was free to concentrate on "military need rather than 'equity"' in
deciding upon the contours of a draft registration system. °'1 Military
basically said Sharon, the young woman in the case, deserved what she got (which from her
story was a rape, see id. at 483-85 n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring)), because she "led on" Michael
M. Id. at 483-85 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In essence, Justice Blackmun argued that women
are totally and justifiably within the power of male-dominated space once they participate in
some sexual activity short of intercourse. This result makes Justice Rehnquist's opinion seem
heroic.
100. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 83
(White, J., dissenting).
101. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
102. Id. at 197.
103. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-72.
104. Id. at 72, 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)). Interestingly,
Justice Rehnquist supported this point by noting that Rostker was easier than Michael M.
because Congress debated the gender issue regarding armed services registration much more
fully than the California legislature did at the time it increased the age of consent for young
women. This point only strengthens my argument. The lengthy congressional debates demon-
strated that a large majority of legislators, in quite stereotypical fashion, could not imagine
women in combat roles.
105. Id. at 76-79.
106. Id. at 81.
107. Id. at 80. Relmquist's use of quotation marks around "equity" emphasized his willing-
ness to reformulate the word's meaning to accommodate the needs of the military.
1990]
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need, of course, eschewed any notion of sending women to combat
positions.
It is hard to take seriously the notion that Rostker represents a
carefully thought-out rule about intentional gender discrimination.
Rehnquist's presumption that the previously enacted restrictions on
women serving in combat roles were constitutional hardly was com-
manded. Nothing in the underlying framework of discrimination law
prevented either the parties or the Court from assuming that the
combat restrictions were invalid. Rather, the fact that the plaintiffs
in building their lawsuit, Justice Rehnquist in composing his majority
opinion, and Justice Brennan in writing his dissent all assumed that
the battlefront bar was valid strongly suggests that the cultural norms
frowning upon women in the trenches were too powerful to ignore.
There is, therefore, little to support the result save the quite obvious
stereotypes that women cannot shoot guns, drive tanks, fly airplanes,
push missile buttons, or die as well as men. Combat zones, like saloons
in the 1870s, simply are places where women, regardless of their
preferences and talents, are not to go. I am sure Justice Rehnquist
would insist that Congress did not "intentionally" discriminate when
it made distinctions between men and women regarding their obliga-
tions to serve in the armed forces. They simply were making "practical
judgments" concerning combat readiness. Like Judge Safford's inabil-
ity to understand how women could organize and operate political
movements, 0 8 the Rostker Court was unable to avoid assumptions
about the appropriate spatial roles of men and women.
C. Social Science, Effects Analysis, and the Supreme Court
Much of the discrimination case law in the last two decades has
involved attempts to develop methods of attacking classifications hav-
ing gendered effects when explicit statements of intention to discrimi-
nate are lacking. Building on the idea that actions based upon an
intention to disadvantage women were unlawful, litigators pushed
courts to accept various forms of evidence as circumstantial proof of
discriminatory intent and to require defendants to justify their actions
if significant circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination was
submitted. Once this sort of legal structure was in place, especially
in various statutory rather than constitutional settings,1- social science
data became a critical feature of many large cases. After courts began
108. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106.
109. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment practice that operated
to exclude blacks prohibited, notwithstanding employer's lack of discriminatory intent).
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relying on such evidence, it became increasingly difficult to justify a
distinction between the harm imposed upon women by practices jus-
tifying an inference of intentional misbehavior and equally pernicious
harms imposed upon women by patterns of behavior extant in the
culture at large. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court's un-
willingness to accept widespread cultural behavior patterns as discrim-
inatory also has led it to view virtually all social science data with
skepticism, if not outright hostility. We have returned to the view
that spatial gender separation reflects our culture, not discrimination.
Social scientists claim they can describe segregated spaces. Indeed,
a list of the ten most racially segregated cities recently was released. 110
Other studies have reported that black defendants are more likely to
face the death penalty when the victim is white rather than black,'11
that employees in jobs dominated by women earn significantly less
than employees in jobs of comparable worth generally held by men,"
2
and that employment preferences for veterans have a disastrous impact
on the ability of women to find employment."3 In recent years the
Court has been uniformly hostile to contentions that such studies pro-
vide a basis for shaping measures to ameliorate the impact of long
standing cultural patterns of spatial separation.
The judicial hostility is not based upon the ever-present debate
about the truth-telling capabilities of statistical analysis.114 Indeed, in
110. See Study Finds Segregation in Cities Worse Than Scientists Imagined, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 5, 1989, at 6, col. 5 (reporting on Massey & Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas: Black-and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989)).
111. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
112. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); American
Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). For
a similar case involving the racial employment and promotion patterns of a single private com-
pany, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
113. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
114. One certainly may make a convincing argument that the social sciences, like the Su-
preme Court Justices, are infected with cultural bias. As noted near the end of the discussion
of Michael M., supra text accompanying notes 76-99, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
was based upon highly dubious assumptions about women's need for special protection in the
workplace. The famous Brandeis brief submitted in support of the protective labor legislation
attacked in Muller was overflowing with excerpts from "scientific" studies supporting such
assumptions. See id. at 419 n.t. The Court's failure to take on the " neutrality" of the social
science establishment dramatically simplifies my argument that discrimination law now ignores
the consequences of "provably" gendered spaces. But even conceding the infectious quality of
bias in the social sciences, the result is the same. First, much evidence exists that supports
the historical notion that men and women frequently have occupied different spaces. Second,
even if studies supporting the existence of segregated spaces are culturally influenced, the
Court's selection of one set of biases supporting the maintenance of male political and economic
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many cases the Court has assumed the validity of the statistical
analysis establishing the existence of spaces segregated by race or
gender before ignoring the data-based conclusions. The most shocking
recent example of this phenomenon is McCleskey v. Kemp.115 Justice
Powell, after describing in detail the conclusions of a study demonstrat-
ing a strong correlation between the races of perpetrators and victims
and the imposition of the death penalty, 116 wrote that the Court accepts
"statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in certain limited con-
texts,' ' 17 such as creation of jury venires or certain Title VII cases.""
However, statistical proof of discrimination in the operation of discre-
tion-filled systems such as Georgia's criminal justice must be "excep-
tionally clear" before the Court would intervene."9 Justice Powell got
it exactly backwards, of course. He ignored the prospect that white
people operating in wholly discretionary arenas are more likely to
implement their authority in racial patterns than when they are con-
strained by tightly operating procedural or substantive limitations.
Less dramatic, but equally clear, rejections of data disclosing gen-
dered spaces also are plentiful. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney?°
may be the most extraordinary. A Massachusetts statute required
that all veterans qualifying for state civil service positions must be
considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans.'
21
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, openly confessed that the
statute "benefit[ted] an overwhelmingly male class"12 and that "the
impact of the .. . law upon the public employment opportunities of
spaces rather than another subjecting such spaces to attack leaves the basic structure of my
argument intact.
115. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
116. Id. at 286-89. The study, accepted as truthful for purposes of the Court's opinion,
found that, ignoring the race of the defendant, the death penalty was more than four times as
likely to be imposed in a case where the victim was white rather than black. When the race of
the defendant was added to the matrix, the class of defendants most likely to be sentenced to
die were black persons convicted of murdering white victims. This relationship was statistically
significant. Prior to adjustment for nonracial factors, the death penalty was imposed in 22% of
the cases involving black defendants and white victims, but in only 1% of the cases involving
black defendants and black victims. Id. at 286-87.
117. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
118. However, this concession, at least in respect to Title VII cases, must be labeled
dubious. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989) (statistical evidence
not accepted as proof of intent to discriminate).
119. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
120. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
121. Id. at 256 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979)).
122. Id. at 269.
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women [had] ... been severe."'' It gave to "veterans who achieve[d]
passing scores [on civil service exams] a well-nigh absolute advan-
tage" over women achieving higher scores.
Nonetheless, Feeney lost. Because the statute was facially neutral,
she was obligated to demonstrate that a "gender-based discriminatory
purpose . . . , at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts
veterans' preference legislation.' ' 1 6 Justice Stewart then concluded
that Massachusetts intended to benefit veterans, not men;1" that wide-
spread knowledge of the gendered consequences of the preference was
not a sufficiently powerful level of intent to question the statute
under extant equal protection doctrine; m and that the record lacked
any evidence that state officials adopted and continued the veterans'
preference with a specific desire to exclude women from the civil
service. 130 The "Catch-22" quality of the outcome became palpable only
two years later when the Court refused to curtail Congress's overtly
gendered decision to exclude women from registration for the draft.13
1
Comparable worth, should it ever come directly before the Court,
surely will meet a similar fate. The Court simply will reject social
science data, in both constitutional and statutory discrimination cases,
as largely beside the point. Even the most solid, convincing statistical
evidence that certain jobs virtually always are held by women and
that these jobs, under any system for measuring comparability that
might be used, produce lower wages than similarly important tasks
virtually always filled by men, will prove to the Court only that the
market operates in certain ways. It will not prove that any individuals
or classes were the victims of intentionally gendered conduct.
123. Id. at 271.
124. Id. at 264.
125. Justices Stevens and White wrote a concurring opinion in which they excused any
possible invidious discrimination because the preference disadvantaged almost as many men
(1,867,000) as it did women (2,954,000). Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring). Besides the fact
that the number of women was almost 60% larger than the number of men, Stevens's and
White's argument did not explain why the existence of a large class of excluded men reduced
the impact of an almost total exclusion of women from the civil service. Their opinion indicated
not only that some of the Justices reject social science, but also that they do not understand it.
126. Id. at 276.
127. Id. at 277.
128. Id. at 279.
129. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), when placed together with Feeney, required
plaintiffs to show a purposeful intent to discriminate to meet constitutional definitions of discrimi-
nation. See id. at 238-42.
130. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
131. See Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); see also infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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The handwriting appeared on the wall for comparable worth in
County of Washington v. Gunther,132 a case involving the payment of
lower wages to female than to male jail guards. The county did a job
evaluation of its civil service system. After evaluating the jail guard
jobs, the study concluded that women guards should be paid ninety-five
percent of the wage of male guards. Despite this recommendation,
the county elected to pay women only seventy percent of the male
wage. 1' Justice Brennan, writing for a bare majority of five, went to
great lengths to declare that comparable worth was not before the
Court.14 The Court held only that the plaintiffs were free to argue
that the county intentionally paid women less than it paid men.3 5
In his dissent Justice Rehnquist argued that only virtually identical
jobs demanded equal pay and that the market, even if it established
gendered wage differentials for comparable but not identical jobs, was
a legitimate basis for determining pay levels.136 Thus, if the county
rejected the conclusions of its comparable worth study in favor of
market level wages, knowing of its gendered consequences, it would
violate neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act. 3 7 The opinions in
Gunther clearly illustrated that public and private organizations may
avoid comparable worth judgments by carefully justifying their wage
levels by reference to market preferences rather than job descriptions.
Once the possibility of overt gender-based wage determinations is
removed, neither opinion in Gunther supports a discrimination hold-
ing.1' This view almost surely commands a majority on the present
Court. 139
132. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
133. Id. at 180-81. The county later also closed down the women's section of the jail and
fired the women. Id. at 164.
134. Id. at 166.
135. Id. at 180-81.
136. Id. at 181-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 184-204 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. The majority did not reject explicitly comparable worth theory, but Justice Brennan
wrote his majority opinion in a noticeably defensive prose. It is, therefore, hard to believe that
all four Justices he convinced to join his opinion (Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens) would have stayed on board had he attempted to create a comparable worth remedy
for the plaintiff.
139. The four dissenting justices in Gunther were Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, and Powell.
Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A majority against comparable worth theories undoubtedly
would now be created by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, White, and O'Connor. In fact,
Justice Kennedy made his views quite clear in American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun.
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding state's decision to base
compensation on the competitive market rather than on comparable worth theory). Justice




The comparable worth debate is a graphic example of the contem-
porary importance of gendered spaces. Comparable worth studies con-
firm the continuing impact of long extant job segregation. Historians
have demonstrated convincingly that most employed women have been
relegated to certain jobs, that women's work often has occurred in
places where the only men present were supervisors, that women
frequently are hired as part of a strategy to reduce labor costs, and
that gender-segregated job patterns facilitate the exercise of economic
power over women workers. 140 Denying the relevance of comparable
worth studies in discrimination theory dismisses the enduring relation-
ships between gendered spaces and economic control of women's work.
V. SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION AND ALLOCATION OF
POLITICAL POWER
Thirty-five years after the decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,141 we are left with the startling conclusion that spatial separation
by race and gender has virtually no meaning in the resolution of
discrimination cases. Intentional gendering of spaces by statutory man-
date or bureaucratic practice now is applauded as a concession to the
reality of human experience. The existence of gendered spaces, clearly
described and well documented by social scientists, is justified by
reference to "unintended" social preferences.
The War on Whiskey contained the seeds of a different perspective
on the idea of discrimination. Recall that the invasion of male saloons
by crusading women had at least three salutary results: it expanded
the range of places available for discourse between the genders, it
forced men to react to concerns of women, and it broke open a place
usable by men to exercise or discuss the continued exercise of political
and economic power.'4 Discrimination law routinely should produce
similar results. Thus, any setting in which men occupy spaces with
more political or economic power in significantly larger numbers than
to women ought be subject to attack. Similarly, any setting in which
long-standing cultural patterns relegate women to the occupancy of
spaces with less political or economic power than those men occupy
should be open for restructuring.'4 Finally, treating discrimination as
140. For an excellent commentary on the history of women and work, see A. KESSLER-HAR-
RIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982).
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
143. Lawrence suggests an analogous theory for dealing with racial differences in allocation
of power, though he relies more on a psychological assessment of the nature of discrimination
than I do in this essay. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Regarding black women, readers may be
155
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a principle for tempering the political and economic authority of dom-
inant groups requires the protection of organizations established by
the less powerful for their own political and economic benefit.
Despite the results of recent discrimination cases,-M spatial separa-
tion is a critical characteristic of many arrangements in which women
are deprived of political and economic power. The male-only registra-
tion for the draft, for example, clearly supports the continued existence
of a tremendously powerful gendered space - the armed forces.
Women are excluded, not only from getting killed on the front lines,
but also from decisions about huge expenditures, extensive employ-
ment opportunities, significant benefit programs, and the formation
of foreign policy at the highest levels. We all have been prevented
from learning if significant changes in discourse about the exercise of
military power will occur when military spaces become the joint ter-
ritory of men and women. 145 Regardless of whether this gendered
space was the result of intentional government policy or centuries of
cultural understandings, little doubt exists about the concentration of
male power it generates. Such a center of male authority should not
be permitted to survive.
146
Conversely, spaces created and used by women for their own ben-
efit must be protected. Built into spatial discrimination theory is the
notion that those excluded from important political and economic
spaces should have a significant voice in changing the operation of
those environments. Spaces occupied by the powerful need to be bro-
ken apart; those created by the less powerful for their own support
tempted to simply "pile up" spatial power allocations to construct a useful discrimination principle.
However, concern about racial identities among black persons may cut across gender lines,
necessitating a different analysis of racially gendered spaces from what I attempt in this essay.
For example, in the change from the Jane to Jim Crow laws, racism overwhelmed previously
gendered spaces. For more discussion of this interplay, see Scales-Trent, supra note 48.
144. E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
145. See, e.g., Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989).
146. Since the creation of wholly volunteer armed services, the proportion of women serving
the country has risen slowly. Recent data suggest that women now comprise over 10% of the
military, though combat roles and serious policymaking positions are totally male domains.
Sexual discrimination and harassment are pervasive. See Open Doors Don't Yield Equality:
'Combat' Ban Symbolizes Limits to Female Advancement in Services, Wash. Post, Sept. 24,
1989, at 1, col. 1. These facts raise intriguing questions about the military roles women will fill
in future generations. For example, participation in front-line action is a traditional prerequisite
for promotion to senior military positions. This practice or other practices may delay seriously
the rise of women through the ranks. See Battle Lines Are Shifting on Women in War, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
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need to be nurtured. 147 Intentional discrimination theories have the
perverse effect of legitimizing attacks on groups organized by the less
powerful for their own benefit. 14 Thus, the Supreme Court evades
the application of even the most traditional intentional discrimination
theories against overtly male spaces when it finds a larger cultural
imperative, but applies intentional discrimination rules rigidly when
those with less economic or political authority attempt to invade spaces
occupied by the powerful or to create spaces for their own use.
49
Affirmative action programs, an obvious remedy for reducing the im-
pact of spaces occupied by the powerful, are viewed instead as cases
about intentional discrimination. 5° Laws supposedly written for the
benefit of groups excluded from important spaces become weapons
used to maintain extant allocations of power.' 5'
Spatial discrimination theory thus compels certain remedial choices.
Rather than focusing merely on creating a path for women's entry
into male spaces, remedial structures routinely should permit those
confined in less-favored spaces to redefine the contours of spaces oc-
cupied by the powerful. Crafting remedies under existing discrimina-
tion theory normally involves creating some framework for ensuring
that those excluded from male spaces may enter them, generally on
147. This nurturing need not apply to traditionally lower paid women's jobs because women
have not organized these tasks for their own benefit.
148. Thus, women's clubs or black clubs ought not be subject to integration orders, while
men's clubs should. And if black colleges and universities, mostly established as the price for
the maintenance of the Plessey separate but equal theory, see Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), have taken on significant roles as organizational points for the black community,
then these colleges ought not be disturbed by "discrimination" decrees.
149. The best the Court has done is to leave some authority in state and local governments
to integrate private clubs. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)
(determining that the limits of state authority over freedom to enter an association involves an
assessment of objective characteristics including size, purpose, policies, selectivity, and congenial-
ity). But the Court has not resolved whether a state specifically can shut men's clubs while
leaving women's clubs open.
150. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (unless a city can
identify specific factual bases necessitating remedial action, treatment of citizens on a racial
basis violates the equal protection clause).
151. Thus, Justice O'Connor, discussing Richmond, Virginia's affirmative action contract
procedures for encouraging minority businesses, wrote for the Court: "Like the claim that
discrimination in primary and secondary schooling justifies a rigid racial preference in medical
school admissions, an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular
industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota." Id. at 724. After reading the
Richmond opinion, one of my colleagues said to me with sarcasm and disdain: 'ou mean I
now have to prove there has been discrimination in Richmond, Virginia during the last two
centuries?"
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terms not significantly different from those that existed before the
litigation. Consideration normally is not given to altering job descrip-
tions, promotion standards, educational requirements, health care plan
provisions, or other terms of employment unless they are part of a
structure intended to benefit men. Women frequently are deprived of
the opportunity to alter the shape of many of the spaces they normally
occupy.
The legislative and judicial treatment of pregnancy leave policies
is a complex example of the problem. 152 In California Federal Savings
& Loan Association v. Guerra1- a California statute required employ-
ers to grant women unpaid pregnancy leaves of up to four months for
any disability "on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions."'- The statute also required employers to reinstate employ-
ees returning from such leaves to their prior jobs unless the jobs were
no longer available due to business necessity.155 The bank argued that
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) provisions of Title VII pre-
empted the statute. Because the PDA, the argument went, required
employers to provide pregnancy disability benefits to women only to
the same extent that they granted disability benefits to men, it pre-
empted any state requirement insisting that women disabled by preg-
nancy be provided greater benefits than men.'1
California's statute did not mention men. It was modeled on the
traditional assumptions that women, but not men, 157 are unable to
work for a period after the birth of a child; that women, but not men,
stay home with an infant for a time while the physical impact of
delivery passes; and that women, even those disabled for a time by
pregnancy and birth, will find a way to take care of their new child
without looking to their men for assistance. In short, the statute was
a classic embodiment of the notion that childcare occurs inside spaces
occupied by women 1' and that, as a result, only women's job security
152. For a review of various rights based arguments about this issue, see Williams, Equal-
ity's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984).
153. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
154. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 275 n.1 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2)
(West 1980)).
155. Id. at 275.
156. Id. at 278.
157. I have used the woman/man dichotomy intentionally, though other parent pairs obvi-
ously exist. Indeed, many psychological parent groupings exist which are larger than doublets.
But the California Federal statute surely was based upon a heterosexual couple model.
158. Though most now consider management of the family economy as a shared enterprise,
the same may not be said of childcare. While the home frequently is used as shared space for
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is placed at risk by the birth of a child. The Court did not consider
the gendered spatial assumptions underlying the California statute.
It merely declined the invitation to pre-empt the law, treating it as
an employment regulation benefitting women in ways permitted but
not required by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendments to
Title VII.1' 9
Recognition of the gendered spatial assumptions underlying the
regulation thoroughly changes the analysis. Because the statute ac-
cepts or defines spatially gendered roles that limit employment oppor-
tunities'6 and requires that those roles be offered only to women, it
should have been treated as discriminatory. The Court, however, did
certain portions of the day or week, traditional ideologies still construe the home as a women's
place when children are present during working hours. Indeed, even when women are not home
with their own children, other women likely will be doing the caretaking. For purposes of the
point in the text, it is sufficient to remember that any space, such as a house, may take on
different gender and spatial characteristics at different times. For a detailed analysis of the
relationships between gender and family, see Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox
and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 135-54 (1989) (discussing some of the limitations of typical discrimination
analysis in cases involving interplay between gender, family, and work).
159. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 292. A logical structure closely related to that in
California Federal is evident in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). Johnson Controls held that a company may forbid women
of childbearing age from working in high lead exposure positions. Id. at 901. The court found
that the policy did not violate Title VII because the possibility of pregnancy and subsequent
harm to a fetus was a satisfactory reason for denying women employment in such jobs. Id. at
890. Thus, the court made use of the stereotypical notion that fetal development is solely related
to a safe space for women.
Lead poisoning of men, however, also is related to proper fetal development. See Williams,
Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981). Compare Hayes v. Shelby Mem. Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding hospital's firing of pregnant technician was result of facially
discriminatory policy) with Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (discussed supra). For a further
discussion of Johnson Controls in this Symposium, see Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration
of Property Archetypes in Racial and Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81, 87-89 (1990).
Rather than permitting women to be fired, the court should have.read Title VII to give women
employees the option of compelling the layoff of men or the cleaning the job environment.
160. Family "benefits" extended only to women "serve to reinforce the notion that a woman's
place is in the office only if she's taken care of her chores at home first." Spayd, Being Too
Nice to Working Mothers, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1989, at H3, col. 4. The California statute
certainly nurtures such stereotyping. On its face, the law provides no absolute guarantee to
women that they will get their jobs back after taking birth leaves. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12945(b)(2) fWest 1980). Even if the job return guarantee was absolute, the result I describe
in the text would remain. Allocation of leaves of absence to women after birth creates substantial
power flisallocations. For example, the statute creates a strong economic incentive to discrimi-
nate silently against initially hiring women of childbearing age. In addition, absence from a
workplace may create problems in promotion, peer acceptance, and operation of seniority rules.
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not have to void the statute. The less-empowered class, the women
employees, should have been given the option of either voiding the
statute or requiring its application to men in the bank as well. Indeed,
if society is really serious about the workplace repercussions of defining
childcare zones as women's space, we would treat the emotional and
physical needs of children as a special problem for all employees, a
problem requiring the provision of uniform caretaker fringe benefits. 161
While California Federal might not have been the appropriate vehicle
for mandating the creation of such widespread benefit programs, the
Court should have modeled any remedy in the case on a structure
designed to reduce the loss of workplace power women routinely con-
front when they have a child. 162
Finally, some spaces may be shared by men and women who each
exercise similar levels of economic, political, or cultural power. The
generic sort of situation at issue in Michael M., though not the Su-
preme Court's analytical techniques, might be such a case.16 If re-
lationships such as consensual intercourse, are not defined by any
significantly gendered space, little is left to justify the protection of
spaces established and occupied by women for their own benefit or
protection. Some argue, however, that sexuality is inherently or fre-
quently a one-sided power relationship and that law should be struc-
tured to provide women with the ability to control unwanted male
aggression. 16 Others counter that statutory rape laws providing special
161. This argument differs from the position of feminist writers advocating an affirmation
of women's special roles as childbearers and nurturers. Cf. Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social
Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV.
107. Defining women's role based on spatial separations of groups also is different than defining
women's role based on feminist concepts of individual connectedness to self or others. See, e.g.,
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
162. This reallocation of power is not a straightforward task. Providing unpaid childcare
leaves of absence on a voluntary basis, for example, probably would not result in a large
proportion of men going home to be with children, at least in the short run. Income differences
between men and women as well as custom will tend to keep women at home with small children.
Federal support for paid leaves of absence would work better, particularly if payments made
to intact couples required both partners to share in childcare as a condition of receiving the
benefits.
163. But note, some argue that sexuality is inherently a male-dominated power relationship.
See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). As
previously indicated, Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Michael M. certainly gives some credence
to the idea that sexuality and pregnancy routinely are defined as burdensome to women, if not
as bestowals of power upon men. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
164. See Olsen, supra note 76, at 407-09. Olsen argued that one way to provide young
women some control over sexual intimacy would be to give them complete authority over the
decision to prosecute for violation of statutory rape laws. In this Symposium issue Robin West
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protection for women foster the stereotype that women are weak and
in need of protection, thereby legitimating and perpetuating the very
power differences protective legislation is designed to ameliorate.165
The feminist debate about the wisdom of using statutory rape laws
to empower women occurs at a wholly different level than the judicial
debate revealed by the opinions in Michael M. While the Court's
dialogue ignored or misconstrued signals about the ways men and
women relate to each other, academics speculate about the differences
between mutually supportive and exploitative relationships. 16 While
the Court ignored the long history of white men segregating and
structuring spaces for their own benefit, academics struggle both to
describe and to measure the cultural prominence of gendered spaces.
While the academic debate may be unresolvable at this historical mo-
ment, at least it is occurring on the appropriate terrain.
If I am forced by the title of this Symposium to make a prediction
about the fate of gender discrimination law in the 1990s, I must restrain
my optimism. Enacting legislation' commanding courts, upon the pe-
tition of an appropriate member of a segregated group, to develop
remedies to control politically or economically powerful space domi-
nated by men requires restructuring the central features of innumer-
able important cultural and political institutions.' That level of activ-
ity may be unlikely to occur until the next wave of the Women's
Movement. 169
argues a related point, contending that the failure to penalize marital rape implicates the state
as a supporter of violence within relationships likely to be dominated by physically stronger
men. See West, supra note 92, at 63-71.
165. See Williams, supra note 76, at 175.
166. One point in this essay is that men and women may have quite different perceptions
about the same spaces, regardless of whether the spaces are shared or separate. The men in
Dunn's drugstore obviously felt quite differently about their bar than did the invading host of
women. Ann Scales makes a related point in her discussion in this Symposium issue of potential
male and female differences towards conceptions of time. See Scales, Feminists in the Field of
Time 42, FLA. L. REV. 95 (1990).
167. Like Robin West's essay on the marital rape exemption in this Symposium issue, see
West, supra note 92, at 45. I agree that continued reliance on federal court discrimination
litigation may be unproductive.
168. A similar problem is discussed in Williams, supra note 40, at 822-36.
169. Historically, a close linkage has existed between bursts of political activity by women
and blacks. Perhaps the next major round of social upheaval in these communities will arrive
when whites no longer comprise a majority of the school age population of the United States,
an event likely to occur fairly early in the next century. Pessimists might insist that we will
have to wait until the middle of the next century when whites will become a minority of our
population. Beyond the Melting Pot, TiME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 28-30.

